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Abstract – There is increasing pressure on medical 
practices to use digital information systems for storage of 
patient data. Some consideration is given to protecting 
these systems from a external or “ hacker”  focus. This 
paper looks at the issue that the increasing use of digital 
information systems has for insider malfeasance. 




In various nations of the world medical practitioners are 
being encouraged or forced into using computer based 
information systems for the storage, processing and 
transmission of medical records. Many of these records are 
being transmitted across the Internet and are often sent 
encapsulated as plaintext formats such as e-mail making 
interception of the medical information a relatively trivial 
task.  
It is well documented in the computer security literature 
and surveys that insiders are a significant risk to systems 
integrity. The other alarming trend is that inside attacks are 
often the most successful and damaging in terms of money 
and loss of reputation. This is typically as a result of the 
insider having intimate operational knowledge that an 
outsider must either socially engineer and extract from the 
organization or bypass in the case of security 
countermeasures. 
One of the prime motivators for moving to the ubiquitous 
use of medical records in digital form is cost and the 
quality of care delivered for the cost. Traditionally medical 
records have been kept as paper based indexes often with 
the filing compactors holding the records being the 
dominate feature within a medical practice.  
These paper records were offline in the true sense of the 
word, if any one wanted to obtain the medical record one 
had to have physical access to the file storage device in this 
case a filing cabinet or compactor to obtain the file. 
Furthermore to take a copy of the file one then had either 
copy notes about the file to a notepad by hand or have 
access to a photocopier or simply purloin it. Some of the 
problems intrinsic to copying the medical information in 
this manner is that unless the filer is organized it could be 
could be difficult or time consuming to locate information 
initially. If the information is not organized alphabetically 
or by incident, or uses chronological placement of 
information within the file locating the exact piece of 
information could take considerable time. The increased 
time makes the threat of discovery in commission of the 
breach escalate considerably. This means that such a 
breach is a high risk activity for commission by an outsider 
but is a profile well suited insider malfeasance. The insider 
however still runs the risk of discovery either in 
commissioning of the breach or egress of the information 
across the physical practice boundary. 
There is little argument that a modern database centric 
information system, typically based on SQL, will garner 
significant cost savings and strategic advantage for an 
organization principally in timely delivery of information 
for legitimate purposes. Further, cost savings can be found 
in significantly reduced storage space required to house 
records. a standard 2m tall rack with a foot print of 0.25m2  
or 0.5m3 can hold a server and several terabytes of storage 
space. This could replace several rooms of paper based 
storage realizing savings in reduced rental costs for floor 
space and given that many medical practices are located in 
high rental value areas this could be substantive. Records 
of this type normally have considerable periods for 
retention of the record that is mandated often via 
legislation.  
Further advantage can be gained through the timely 
retrieval or interrogation of medical records from a 
database system. Little labour expense is now expended in 
the physical retrieval and re-storage of the record itself a 
further significant cost saving. 
A counter to this is that speed of compromise and 
specific targeted attack for illegitimate purposes by an 
attacker is also likely to gain significant advantage through 
the use of digital systems on networks. With digital records 
several risk factors for the intruder in the compromise of a 
file are significantly reduced or even moot. This is further 
compounded if the internal network is connected to the 
Internet. The risk of covert retrieval, destruction, 
 modification or discovery of medical records is now 
significantly increased and some of this risk is co-
incidental risk. This is where the medical record for 
example is transmitted co-incidentally as a product of 
malicious activities and not as a specific target of an 
activity. In this scenario a mass mailing malware program 
that simply finds documents or existing emails on a hard 
disk and emails them to people within the address book 
could have devastating and real effects. 
This paper will explore the issues the move towards 
medical information systems and their increasingly on-line 
interactions have for medical practitioners and the threat 
from insider malfeasance. 
Many medical organizations are being as mentioned 
before being coerced or cajoled into installing IT based 
systems by governments or suppliers to replace paper 
based record systems with cost being touted as one of the 
main drivers. Little if any thought is often given to the 
security of that data at rest on the hard disk of the database 
server. Furthermore, now as other suppliers of medical 
diagnostics in the form of pathology tests, x-ray or 
ultrasound are generating their data in electronic forms 
they too for reasons of efficiency and costs savings are 
moving to electronic delivery of results. The fax machine is 
supplanted now with an email of results to the requesting 
health professional further extending the problem domain. 
 
2 Infrastructure 
2.1 Networking and Servers 
Most medical information systems contain customized 
SQL database applications that run on specialized and 
dedicated server architectures.  These databases are 
normally accessed by client PCs which are distributed 
across a network typically using Ethernet within the 
physical confines of the medical business. Furthermore, 
these networks are increasingly now being linked to the 
Internet typically via broadband connection such as ADSL 
with access speeds as high as 24Mbits per second. 
The infrastructure described is relatively complex in 
computing terms and some exploration of the attendant 
risks for medical practices in particular will be undertaken 
in the following sections.  Firstly, there is typically a SQL 
database server which contains the actual client databases 
which contain the digital records of the customers. These 
records not only record textual data but may also contain 
scans, diagnostic results and graphical images of patients. 
These databases need to be maintained, patched and 
secured against a large range of threats requiring highly 
specialised skills nearly always beyond the scope and 
capabilities of IT support mechanisms within medical 
practices. The SQL database engines themselves are 
vulnerable to exploit and there are many documented 
instances of this on computer security sites such as CERT, 
AusCERT and vendor specific sites such as Microsoft or 
Oracle.  
What further complicates the issue for many medical 
practices is that these medical applications are highly 
specialized in application and therefore they are generated 
often by boutique or specialist developers whose primary 
focus is the generation of a competent medical records 
system and not security. Hence, the applications 
themselves may contain serious security flaws or errors of 
logic resulting in exploit that could allow escalation of 
privilege either within the database or the underlying 
operating system. Many of these potential exploits due to 
the low profile of many of these companies may go 
undetected for considerable lengths of time. 
SQL Servers are increasingly open to malicious attack in 
the form of SQL injection attacks [1-3]. These types of 
attack allow malicious users to inject or modify the data 
contained in a database structure from a Web-based 
interface that uses a scripting language such as PHP or 
Microsoft ASP to accept and pre-process input. These sort 
of attacks can be perpetrated by any individual with access 
to the scripting language either via a Web interface or a 
command line, allowing external or internal compromise. 
Client access to the database systems will normally be 
done through a customized client interface often using Web 
technologies to enable it.  It is also reasonable to assume 
because these systems are used in a trusted environment 
often they will have lower enforced security settings. The 
job function of a medical secretary is often to update notes 
and other annotations as directed by the medical 
practitioner.  The ability to do this means, that a secretary 
must have high levels of access to the database, that in 
other systems typically they would not have such a high 
level of access. 
 
2.2 Internet connection 
Many medical practices are now also being forced to use 
the Internet for communications and conduct of normal 
practice business.  Diagnostic tests such as pathology and 
x-rays are increasingly corresponded in electronic formats. 
In addition many medical supply companies now have 
online ordering systems which are accessed across the 
Internet to effect the rendering of goods and services. In 
some cases doctors particularly specialists are using Web 
sites to promote their businesses and acquire customers. 
This now sees many medical practices using broadband 
technologies on a 24/7 basis exposing not only the 
connecting PC but potentially the entire medical 
information system to compromise. 
 Broadband connection itself brings many advantages to 
the user including increased speed of download and the 
ability to search and work faster for instance however, 
these same capabilities also work to aid an attacker. In the 
same way that a legitimate using the system can download 
information up 100 times faster than conventional analog 
modems so too can attackers send and receive at increased 
speeds[4]. The greater use of bandwidth across the Internet 
connection allows an attacker when internal or external to 
hide their attack within bigger data streams than is possible 
with conventional analog modems. What makes some 
medical practices high-value targets is the type of data they 
store such as before and after photography of cosmetic 
surgery for instance. Some other groups may also want to 
access patient medical histories for example before 
employing them or insuring them. It is far easier for a 
malicious insider to readily re-transmit this data at 
broadband speeds on the Internet than the conventional 
methods of physically accessing and duplicating the 
physical asset. 
With many of these medical practices being small in size 
they typically will use personal firewall products which in 
some cases were found to be defective[5]. Fortunately, 
many of the new operating systems such as Windows XP 
Service Pack 2 and hardware devices such as ADSL 
routers have firewalls and other countermeasures turned on 
by default. However, most Internet-based countermeasures 
are typically externally focused and are not well suited to 
detecting insider malfeasance. With the introduction of 
broadband into these practices it will allow insiders for 
instance use personal data stores on the Internet to hive 
stolen data with little risk of detection.  
It has been shown in previous studies that systems that 
are not regularly patched are susceptible to a wide range of 
attacks and this includes networking hardware. Many of 
these attacks allow for remote execution of code on the 
victim system an example of this is MS03-26 [6] whose 
vector of exploit is a specifically crafted TCP packet sent 
to the victim machine. The receipt of this packet on a 
vulnerable machine then allows for remote procedure calls 
(RPC) to be made to the victim machine from the attacker.  
RPC allows the execution of programs or utilities on the 
system for instance format C:  or del *.*  with impunity.  
Similarly insiders will have intimate knowledge of the 
patch level of systems and will be able to use suitable 
malware to attack the system. This would allow for 
possible remote compromise in non-business hours from a 
remote location such as a home based ADSL connection as 
the insider already know the IP and the level of 
vulnerability in the system. So traditional scanning 
activities an outside attacker would have to perform is 
moot and compromise of the system is almost assured with 
insider knowledge. 
As well as traditional viruses and worms there is the 
increasing use of targeted spyware programs[7].  Unlike 
conventional viruses and worms these spyware programs 
are specifically built to extract confidential data from 
systems such as passwords to then enable full compromise 
of the system at will. This emergent trend is worrying as 
unlike previous malware vectors its purpose is not wanton 
destruction of systems for fun but specific targeted 
activities for potential profit through theft or fraud.  An 
insider can literally load these types of programs at will 
onto internal systems and have them report results to an 
external server for later collection and use or even 
internally to their computer. 
 
2.3 Memory gone in a flash 
There has been massive expansion in the growth of flash 
memory technologies such as USB memory sticks, SD 
memory sticks, portable storage and playback devices such 
as IPOD, MP3 players. Staff in medical practice regularly 
bring these devices into their work environment with little 
if any observation or auditing of activity. Examples of the 
real threat that these devices pose will now be illustrated.  
USB memory sticks can now be purchased that are 16 
GB in raw storage capacity and are small enough to be 
readily concealable.  Using text files and compressive 
technologies on such large memory sticks it is feasible to 
store up to 200 GB of raw data posing significant threats 
for protection of data. For example it could be possible to 
store all of the medical records from a sizeable practice on 
one stick using a simple SQL database ASCII text file 
dump routine that contains SQL queries and table 
constructs for the whole database. Similarly, saving all 
word processing documents in text format and storing them 
on the stick is possible.  Detection of such activity would 
be beyond most medical practices and in fact many IT 
enabled enterprises.  
USB memory devices allow for targeted extraction of 
information about patients on to the media for later 
transport beyond the organizational barrier and disclosure 
and distribution to others. One of the other major problems 
is a recognition that these devices are capable of carrying 
computer related data for example someone walking out of 
an organization which is iPod around the neck does not 
send the same signal is the same individual carrying a 
handful of CDs. 
 
2.4 Tangible to Intransigent Data 
Governments and supplier organizations are pushing 
medical practices to move from paper-based records to 
digital records. This in itself is not an illogical objective 
and it has been proven in various case studies such as  
McKesson’s Medical Supplies to enable significant 
 strategic benefit through the use of information technology. 
This change however, has taken away many of the 
organizational cues and clues to potential insider 
malfeasance. Previously for a patient record to be 
compromised typically the insider needed physical access 
to the storage system or location so that they could access 
the physical paper folder that contained the medical notes. 
To extract this information the insider had two other 
memorize, photocopy or note particularly relevant pieces 
of information. This process often required several 
attempts at extraction of the relevant information meaning 
that there were several instances of physical potentially 
seen activity that had to occur.  Also, the diversity of media 
often found in the physical file, everything from 
handwritten notes, type letters, type notes and photographic 
x-ray film made total atomic compromise virtually 
infeasible. 
The increasingly digital nature of the data stored on 
medical systems expunges many of these visual and 
physical cues that insiders would have two risk to obtain 
the relevant charter.  Furthermore, the increasingly 
monolithic nature of these medical databases i.e. they store 
everything in digitally accessible forms in one record or 
patient instance, makes theft, destruction or compromise of 
this data significantly easier.  
Another attack vector that was not possible or hard to 
achieve with paper-based records, is that of alteration. For 
instance, it is a reasonably difficult process to modify an x-
ray film, however, for its digital equivalent it is not. 
Likewise alteration of digital test results is a relatively 
trivial task as many of these are sent as e-mail which are 
often saved as text files which can be readily manipulated. 
 
3 Remedies 
It is inevitable that medical systems will become IT 
based and appropriate risk methodologies and responses 
must be developed to protect these systems. Many of the 
systems used in practices have parallels with out SOHO 
based businesses and much of the existing literature in this 
are can be leveraged to support development of best 
practices in this area. Recent work by Williams [8] is 
looking at developing risk assessment methods for medical 
practices and this will aid in addressing these issues. There 
are however, some basic security steps that can undertaken 
to protect data both in transit and at rest from insider 
malfeasance for minimal or low cost. 
Encryption technologies can assist greatly in protecting 
data in transit and at rest. Firstly, in transit the use of SSL 
tunnels or enabled services such as email (POP3S, IMAPS) 
or web (https) prevents compromise in transit. Secondly the 
use of operating system enabled encryption such 
Encrypting File System (EFS) in Microsoft operating 
systems makes compromise of data more difficult for any 
attacker. EFS uses per user encryption meaning that several 
users can use the same PC or server and not be able to 
access each others files except through a direct login using 
the other users credentials.  Finally the use of an at rest data 
encryption tool such as a Silicon Data Vault or Seagate 
(Drive) will further protect data from insider malfeasance. 
Standard Operating Environment (SOE) development, 
securing and restriction of same can alleviate many 
problems by denying avenues for malfeasance. As an 
example Windows XP SP2 now allows for policy based 
restrictions to be placed on the USB ports of the machine 
disallowing connection of USB based devices. The 
enforcement of EFS via policy is also possible adding 
further barriers to insider malfeasance.  
Auditing technologies likewise will at least alert to 
insider access of materials. Nearly all network operating 
systems all for extensive auditing of file access on server 
platforms. SQL servers have extensive logging and 
auditing capabilities that can be used to track down to field 
level within a record who has accessed or altered content. 
This nearly always requires specialist setup but have 
various easy to use tools to alert an administrator or 
business owner of unusual activity. 
The use of file integrity checkers such as Tripwire which 
computes MD5 checksum hashes of files and notifies when 
there are changes to files could also be very useful. These 
integrity checkers can also be employed at PC level to 
detect the installation of malware and spyware. 
Monitoring of Internet usage is a simple and effective 
tool that is often neglected. Tracking a users browsing or 
email habits can show if a users activity has become 
abnormal i.e. they have recently been sending multi-
megabyte files to a external email address or their 
outbound web activity has increased significantly all of 
these are indicators of possible malicious activity by 
insiders.  
The use of firewalls, anti-virus and spyware checkers 
should be mandatory as should their updates. A review or 
audit of these periodically will also potentially indicate 
where insiders have changed configurations or allowed 
activities that are not allowed such as opening the firewall 
to allow file transfer, file sharing or chat clients access to 
the Internet. This are again indicators of potential insider 
threat either by accident or intent. Some of these changes 
can also be as a result of social engineering attacks 
perpetrated by chain emails. 
 
 4 Conclusion 
The move to digital records for medical data has 
significantly changed the threat landscape for compromise 
by insiders. Many vendors are well aware of external 
threats but often are lax or discounting of the threat that 
insiders pose when developing or selling product. Digitized 
medical artifacts are far easier to intercept, manipulate, 
destroy or transmit than their physical paper or film 
counterparts. However, some simple steps can be taken to 
mitigate against internal threats which also have the bonus 
of hardening the systems to external attack. Many of the 
suggested changes to systems come at little for no extra 
expense to the system owner. 
Most crimes are as a result of knowledge motive and 
opportunity. Knowledge for insiders to glean useful 
information as a result of digitization is lowered no longer 
does the insider have to make a determination of what 
notes are relevant they simply copy and transmit the entire 
monolithic record. Opportunity is greatly increased as a 
high speed conduit is now available to transmit the data on 
or an easy concealable storage device has the capacity to 
hold all data needed. Furthermore, the opportunity to be 
caught doing this is greatly decreased unless appropriate 
steps have been taken to internally secure the data store. 
Motivation or lack thereof is all too readily overcome with 
disparate proportioned cash incentives.  
Urgent research needs to be conducted in this area to 
identify suitable methods and frameworks to enable SOHO 
or small medical practices to better protect patient records. 
Finally, next time you are at your doctors and they are 
happily typing in your details on their system ask them 
politely how they secure your information from 
compromise by staff or external attackers. 
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